Behind all the talk of a TransPacific Partnership (TPP) as a template for future region-wide economic cooperation lie broader geopolitical issues summed up by President Barack Obama's pledge to restore Southeast Asia to a prominent place on his political agenda.

Previously, the approach was via "ASEAN+3", involving the 10 Southeast Asian nations along with China, Japan and South Korea. Given the economic and geopolitical realities essentially that gave China the central role.

The TPP, however, brings in the US and countries like Australia and New Zealand, and China has not been slow in describing it as a mechanism to limit or even exclude it - the old cold war 'containment' in a new guise. It recalls previous American attempts at regional counterbalance military alliances through SEAT0 (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) and ANZUS (bringing together the three countries mentioned above).

Humiliating defeat in Vietnam and public disillusionment with Asian military adventures saw Washington turn away from the region.

However, conflicting territorial claims in the East and South China Seas between China and its neighbors encourage it to return as the regional powerbroker while providing an "insurance policy".

ASEAN's invitation to Obama to attend the East Asia Summit for the first time was implicit recognition of this. As one Indian commentator put it colorfully: "If you are in a cage with an 800-pound gorilla [China], you should at least invite another one in to provide balance.'

Little wonder China has reacted strongly (imagine if Chinese warships started patrolling the Californian coast!) as, from India to Australia via Myanmar, this new, higher American profile becomes evident.

Australia first: During his visit Down Under President Obama announced plans to station 2,500 marines in Darwin. A small number, perhaps; but highly symbolic, as this town was in the forefront in halting the seemingly inexorable advance of the Japanese military juggernaut in WWII and now provides a good springboard for the US military to react quickly to events in Southeast Asia again.

One recalls the 1960s, when President Lyndon Johnson sought allies for the war in South Vietnam, Australia - nervous that Communism was replacing Japan as the main threat to its security - was enthusiastic, the late Prime Minister Harold Holt even declaring: "All the way with LBJ".

This writer saw what that meant during a fraught year in Vietnam with the Australian Army!

Ruinous Asian land wars are out of the question after Korea and Vietnam. Now, the strategy is to ensure a very strong US air-sea capability in the adjoining Pacific and Indian oceans to match the growing strength of China.

Not all Australians think US bases are a good idea, however. The opposition argument seems to be that any such move will appear threatening to China, which will cause it to increase the size of its military, which, in turn, will scare China's neighbors and America, and cause them to further strengthen their own military capabilities to can contain China.

This, of course, is a classic security dilemma that is likely to cause trouble and more instability, as the Indonesian Government has also made clear.

India, meanwhile, offers attractions as a western anchor of this strategy in return for more US assistance in its modernization both economic and military. Indeed, Indian commentators recently have been discussing the leverage their country can gain from an American return to the Asian center stage.

But one of the most intriguing aspects is the prospect of closer ties between the US and Myanmar - long a target of vilification and Western sanctions for alleged suppression of opposition forces typified by Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi.

Myanmar has suddenly become important as it is about to assume the revolving chairmanship of ASEAN, and President Obama sent a clear signal of Washington's interest by sending Secretary of State Hilary Clinton to Yangon for exploratory talks.

What has got the Obama Administration excited is a perception that, while China has been Myanmar's strongest supporter during the years of international diplomatic and economic isolation, Burmese remain wary of their powerful northern neighbor.

A recent analysis I have seen talks of China's 'Two-Ocean Strategy'. This relates to the fact that, unlike America, blessed with east and west-facing coasts, China fronts only the Paci?c. But much of its imports of crude oil and other key commodities come via the Indian Ocean, funneled through the narrow Malacca Straits and vulnerable to crippling interdiction by hostile forces.

Myanmar offers a solution through Chinese-owned ports and pipelines, so the American argument goes- enough reason to send Secretary Clinton jetting off to fish in troubled waters.

The author is a columnist with China.org.cn. For more information please visit:

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/geoffreymurray.htm

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